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It is generally thought that some of those who serve in government
should possess some degree of immunity from civil liability for acts
performed as part of their official duties.' This is considered neces-
sary so that government officials who are called upon to exercise dis-
cretion in their duties will not be deterred from vigorously perform-
ing their jobs in the public interest' Thus, in the United States,
members of the executive branch, such as governors,3 teachers, 4 po-
lice officers, 5 and prison officials,6 have been granted, under the com-
mon law, a qualified immunity from civil liability for their official
actions. Under this qualified immunity, executive officers are exempt
from civil liability for their wrongful behavior unless it can be shown
that they knew or should have known that their behavior was
improper.'
On the other hand, under the common law, legislators enjoy abso-
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lute immunity in their official functions,8 and judges likewise enjoy
absolute immunity from civil liability for their official functions so
long as they are not utterly lacking in jurisdiction." Absolute immu-
nity for judges means that they may not be sued for their wrongful
judicial behavior, even when they act for purely corrupt or malicious
reasons.
10
The doctrine of judicial immunity is deeply entrenched in our le-
gal system. It has been used to guard judges from common law
causes of action, including false imprisonment," malicious prosecu-
tion,12 and libel, 13 as well as from statutory causes of action for the
deprivation of civil liberties and constitutional rights. 14 This immu-
nity, however, does not apply to disciplinary actions against judges
for violations of the professional and ethical standards that pertain to
their conduct. This Article examines the doctrine of judicial immu-
nity in the civil and criminal spheres. It analyzes the application of
judicial immunity, as well as its limits, and appraises the notion that
judicial immunity must be absolute to be effective.
I. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
It is often said that the doctrine of judicial immunity has ancient
common law origins. While this may be true, some of the historical
claims made for judicial immunity have been exaggerated. Some his-
torians believe that under early English law, judges were generally
liable for their wrongful acts, and judicial immunity was the excep-
tion and not the rule.15 Exaggeration has also occurred in respect to
the history of judicial immunity in the United States. Indeed, even
the Supreme Court has made some questionable assertions about the
historical status of judicial immunity in this country. In a 1967 opin-
ion, the High Court contended that the doctrine of judicial immunity
had been settled and accepted throughout the states by the year
1871.18 More thorough research, however, has shown that in 1871
there was substantial variation about judicial immunity from state to
8. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
9. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967).
10. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
11. Ravenscroft v. Casey, 139 F.2d 776 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 745
(1944); Stahl v. Currey, 135 Ohio St. 253, 20 N.E.2d 529 (1939).
12. O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
926 (1966).
13. Garfield v. Palmieri, 297 F.2d 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871
(1962).
14. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555; Stump, 435 U.S. at 359.
15. Compare Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L.
REv. 201 (1980) with Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity,
1980 DUKE L.J. 879.
16. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 560.
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state.17 In that year, thirteen states followed the rule of absolute im-
munity; nine states had considered the issue of immunity but had not
ruled definitively on it; nine other states had not considered the issue;
and six states had ruled that judges are not immune if they act
maliciously.18
As a historical matter, the doctrine of judicial immunity arose in
response to the creation of the right of appeal. In the tenth and elev-
enth centuries in England, when no right of appeal existed, losing
litigants could challenge unfavorable judgments on the ground that
they were false.' 9 The litigant was entitled to both the nullification of
a false judgment and a fine (known as an amercement) against the
judge who had rendered it.20 As the right to appeal became availa-
ble, it replaced amercements against judges, and gradually the doc-
trine of judicial immunity developed." In modern times, however, it
has become questionable whether the availability of appeal is in all
instances an adequate substitute for imposing liability on judges for
their wrongful acts. Although a judge's act may eventually be re-
versed on appeal, the victim of the judge's behavior may have suf-
fered damage in the interim for which appeal may not compensate.
Indeed, irreversible and serious damage may have occurred, which is
not correctable by appeal.
Nevertheless, once appeal became available, judicial immunity
was gradually accepted under the common law. In the seminal case
of Floyd v. Barker,22 decided by Lord Coke in 1607, judicial immu-
nity was established for judges who served on English courts of rec-
ord. In that decision, Lord Coke discussed for the first time what are
now considered some of the modern policies that underlie the doc-
trine of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity serves the following
purposes according to Lord Coke: (1) It insures the finality of judg-
ments; (2) it protects judicial independence; (3) it avoids continual
attacks upon judges who may be sincere in their conduct; and (4) it
protects the system of justice from falling into disrepute.2
Some of the purposes that have been advanced in support of judi-
17. See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322 (1969).
18. Id. at 326-27.
19. See M. COMISKY & P. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION, COMPENSA-
TION, ETmICS, AND DISCIPLINE 233 (1987).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).
23. Id. at 1307.
cial immunity are less convincing than others. It is debatable
whether any of them justify absolute, rather than limited, immunity
for judges. In a nation such as ours, which is founded on freedom of
speech and which encourages criticism of government officials, using
judicial immunity to protect the reputation of the judiciary is barely,
if at all, legitimate. Ensuring the finality of judgments may be a
valid goal, but it is not strong enough to justify absolute immunity
for malicious judicial behavior that causes serious harm to others.
While innocent judges should be sheltered from continual harass-
ment, what about judges who are not innocent? Protecting judicial
independence is an extremely important goal, but still, one wonders
if absolute immunity is necessary to safeguard the independence of
the judiciary.
Today it is generally recognized that the most important purpose
of judicial immunity is to protect judicial independence. 24 As the Su-
preme Court has said, judicial immunity is needed because judges,
who often are called upon to decide controversial, difficult, and emo-
tion-laden cases, should not have to fear that disgruntled litigants
will hound them with litigation charging improper judicial behav-
ior.25 To impose this burden on judges would constitute a real threat
to judicial independence. The question that remains, however, is
whether absolute, as distinguished from qualified, immunity is neces-
sary to protect judicial independence. Absolute immunity is strong
medicine, justified only by a grave threat to the effective administra-
tion of justice.26 As Justice Douglas suggested in his dissenting opin-
ion in Pierson v. Ray, 7 perhaps immunity should not extend to all
judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous their
conduct.28
The grant of absolute immunity to judges has often been criti-
cized, especially because it is judges who have granted absolute im-
munity to themselves. 29 Referring to the rule of absolute immunity
for judges, an esteemed commentator once remarked that a "cynic
might be forgiven for pointing out just who made this rule."30 More-
over, the rule has been applied in some infamous cases in which
24. See C. WOLRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 970 (1986).
25. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); see also Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219, 226-28 (1988).
26. See Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 660 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
27. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
28. See id. at 558-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Compare Note, supra note 17 with Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under
the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615
(1970). See also Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 390
(1977); Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. (1978);
Feinman & Cohen, supra note 15; Block, supra note 15.
30. W. PROSSER, TORTS 987 (4th Ed. 1971).
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judges have engaged in egregious behavior. Stump v. Sparkman,3' a
1978 Supreme Court decision, was such a case. This case involved a
state court order authorizing the sterilization of a fifteen-year-old
girl on the petition of her mother. The mother's petition stated that
the girl was somewhat retarded and had begun dating men, making
sterilization necessary to prevent pregnancy. However, the girl's high
school record indicated that in all probability she was not retarded.
3 2
The state court judge who granted the petition ordering sterilization
of the girl did not hold a hearing, appoint counsel or a guardian ad
litem for the girl, or notify her of the petition or subsequent order.33
Despite these flagrant violations of due process of law, the Supreme
Court ruled that the state court judge possessed absolute immunity
for his acts and could not be held liable for any harm they caused.
Tremendous criticism has since been directed at the Supreme
Court's decision in Stump,3 4 but absolute immunity for judges re-
mains the rule.
II. To WHOM IMMUNITY APPLIES
As a general matter, judicial immunity protects all judges, from
the lowest to the highest court, so long as they are performing a
judicial act that is not clearly beyond their jurisdiction.3 5 Judicial
immunity is enjoyed by both state and federal judges, 6 and by
judges of general jurisdiction as well as limited jurisdiction.37 Al-
though, at one time, judges of inferior courts or courts of limited
jurisdiction were afforded a restricted degree of immunity or no im-
munity at all,38 that is no longer the case. Today these judges possess
31. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
32. See id. at 351.
33. Id. at 360.
34. See Nagel, supra note 29; Nahmod, Persons Who Are Not "Persons": Abso-
lute Individual Immunity Under Section 1983, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1978); Rosenberg,
Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity, 64 VA. L. REV. 833 (1978);
Feinman & Cohen, supra note 15; Block, supra note 15.
35. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 547 (1967); see also Pomeranz v. Class, 82
Colo. 173, 257 P. 1086 (1927); State ex rel. Clark v. Libbert, 96 Ind. App. 84, 177 N.E.
873 (1931); Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187, 197 N.E. 884 (1935); Health v. Cornelius,
511 S.W.2d 683 (Tenn. 1974).
36. See Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd
sub nom. Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Brown v. Dunne, 409
F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1969).
37. Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913); Sarchet v. Phillips, 102 Colo. 318, 78
P.2d 1096 (1938); Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1898); Berry v. Smith,
148 Va. 424, 139 S.E. 252 (1927).
38. See Voll v. Steele, 141 Ohio St. 293, 47 N.E.2d 991 (1943); Williamson v.
the same degree of immunity as any other judges.39 Justices of the
peace, magistrates, and other lay judges are included within the
grant of immunity enjoyed by the judicial branch.40 However, many
of the cases in which immunity has been denied because the judge
acted in clear excess of jurisdiction involve justices of the peace or
other lay judges.41 This suggests that in practice there may be less
tolerance of judicial immunity for judges who are not formally
trained in the law.42
Judicial immunity has been given to administrative law judges and
hearing examiners in administrative agencies.43 It has been held that
court commissioners are judicial officers and, therefore, entitled to
immunity for their official acts.44 Judicial immunity also has been
granted to persons who perform quasi-judicial functions, and to indi-
viduals whose authority is the functional equivalent of that exercised
by a judge.4" But judicial immunity will not be extended to persons
who are not at least quasi-judicial officers,46 nor will it be extended
beyond their judicial functions.47
When judges delegate their authority or appoint persons to per-
form services for the court, their judicial immunity may follow the
delegation or appointment. Court-appointed mediators have been
given judicial immunity for performing judicial tasks.48 It also has
been ruled that a doctor, appointed by a court to act as an examiner
in an insanity hearing, is a quasi-judicial officer who possesses immu-
nity from liability for any action taken in conjunction with the hear-
ing.49 And court clerks and bailiffs have been granted immunity for
their activities that are judicial in nature.50
The law clerks of judges also are entitled to share in judicial im-
munity.5 It has been said that while some of the tasks performed by
Lacy, 86 Me. 98, 29 A. 943 (1893); Robertson v. Parker, 99 Wis. 652, 75 N.W. 423
(1898).
39. See Alzua, 231 U.S. at 111.
40. See Perez v. Borchers, 567 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831
(1978).
41. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 24, at 971.
42. See id.
43. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 478 (1978).
44. Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 295 N.W. 299 (1940).
45. Morales v. Vegas, 483 F. Supp. 1057 (D.P.R. 1979); Miller v. Reddin, 293 F.
Supp. 216 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
46. See Brown v. Rosenbloom, 34 Colo. App. 109, 524 P.2d 626 (1974), afJd,
188 Colo. 83, 532 P.2d 948 (1975).
47. McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578 (W.D. Va. 1973).
48. Mills v. Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1985).
49. See Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 43, 295 N.W. 299, 299 (1940).
50. Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832
(1984); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981); Slotnick v. Stavinskey, 560 F.2d
31 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978); Adkins v. Clark County, 105
Wash. 2d 675, 717 P.2d 275 (1986).
51. Oliva v. Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), a~fd, 839 F.2d 37 (2d
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court clerks are judicial in character, the work of judges' law clerks
is entirely So. 51 Law clerks are sounding boards for the judges who
employ them and are privy to judges' thoughts and ideas about the
law and the cases over which they preside. One court has
said-perhaps with some exaggeration-that law clerks are simply
extensions of the judges whom they serve, and for purposes of abso-
lute judicial immunity, judges and law clerks are as one.
5 4
III. THE LIMITS OF IMMUNITY
A. Jurisdictional Limitations
Judicial immunity does not extend to the actions taken by a judge
in the clear absence of jurisdiction. In determining if a judge acted
in clear absence of jurisdiction, the focus is on subject matter juris-
diction rather than personal jurisdiction. At least one opinion, how-
ever, takes the position that if a court does not have personal juris-
diction, it lacks all jurisdiction and thereby forfeits judicial
immunity. 6 It is frequently said that the scope of a court's jurisdic-
tion should be broadly construed in order to enhance the policies that
underlie judicial immunity.57 The United States Supreme Court has
stated that judges will not be deprived of immunity merely for acting
in excess of jurisdiction; rather, they will be subject to liability only
when acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
5 8
In a number of cases, judges have been sued for summarily hold-
ing individuals in contempt of court and ordering them incarcer-
ated.59 Several decisions have held that, while this may be an act in
excess of jurisdiction, so long as the judge had subject matter juris-
diction over the case, it is not an act taken clearly in the absence of
Cir. 1988); see also Eades v. Sterlinski, 810 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
847 (1987); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984).
52. Oliva, 670 F. Supp. at 526.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Green v.
Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013 (2nd Cir. 1983).
56. See Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 939 (1981).
57. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076; Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985).
58. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
59. See King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985);
see also Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101
(1986).
jurisdiction and therefore is not beyond the ambit of judicial immu-
nity.60 In one case, it was ruled that a judge who issued a summary
contempt order did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction de-
spite that the order was contrary to a longstanding precedent and
was unconstitutional as well.6
On the other hand, judicial immunity has been denied where a
judge issued an arrest warrant without a sworn complaint as re-
quired by law. Such an act has been held to be in clear excess of
jurisdiction, and courts have refused to grant immunity from civil
actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.6 2 In a similar
vein, a justice of the peace was held liable for malicious prosecution
for framing an affidavit to indicate that an offense had been commit-
ted within the territorial jurisdiction of his court when he knew full
well that was not the case.6 3 Another justice of the peace was found
to be acting completely beyond his jurisdiction when he tried a mo-
torist under a statute that did not exist for an offense that occurred
outside the jurisdiction of his court.64
B. Nonjudicial Acts
The immunity that judges possess from civil liability extends only
to acts that are judicial in nature. Unfortunately, it is very difficult
to define exactly what constitutes a judicial act. It is clear, though,
that judicial immunity is defined as well as justified by the functions
it serves, not by the office of the person to whom it attaches.65 In
Stump v. Sparkman,6 the Supreme Court explained that the rele-
vant factors to determine whether an act is judicial are the character
of the act itself-that is, whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge-and the expectations of the parties-that is, whether the
parties believe they are dealing with a judge in his or her judicial
capacity. 7 Applying these factors in Stump, the Court ruled that it
was a judicial act when a judge approved a petition from a mother
ordering the sterilization of her minor child even though the petition
was not given a docket number, was not filed with the clerk's office,
"and was approved in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the
minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of a guard-
60. E.g., Adams, 764 F.2d at 298.
61. Id. at 294.
62. See, e.g., Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947); Utley
v. City of Independence, 240 Or. 384, 402 P.2d 91 (1965).
63. State ex rel. Little v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64
So. 2d 697 (1953).
64. Vickrey v. Dunivan, 59 N.M. 90, 279 P.2d 853 (1955).
65. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988).
66. 435 U.S. 349 (1978); see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
67. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
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ian ad litem.' ' 8
Because it is not uncommon for state judges to be requested to
approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, and because the
petition was presented to the judge in his official capacity, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the act in question was judicial in na-
ture." This conclusion was reached despite a stinging dissent assert-
ing that what the judge did was in no way an act normally
performed by a member of the judiciary. Judges, the dissent
pointed out, "are not normally asked to approve a mother's decision
to have her child given surgical treatment generally" or, more specif-
ically, to have her daughter sterilized. 1 Indeed, the dissent main-
tained that there was no reason to believe that the acts taken by the
judge in Stump had ever been performed by any other judge in that
state, either before or since. 2
Expanding on the factors articulated in Stump to decide if an act
is judicial in nature, lower courts have focused on: (1) Whether the
precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the events oc-
curred in court or an adjunct area such as the judge's chambers; (3)
whether the controversy centered around a case then pending before
the judge; and (4) whether the events at issue arose directly and
immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her offi-
cial capacity. These considerations are to be construed generously
in support of judicial immunity, keeping in mind the policies that
underlie it,74 and immunity may be granted even though one of the
factors is not met.7 Moreover, a judge's motivation to act against
someone because of personal malice does not turn a judicial act into
a nonjudicial one.76
Findings of nonjudicial action are usually limited to either admin-
istrative acts, which are discussed below, or behavior that is highly
aberrational." In one case, a justice of the peace made an "arrest"
68. See id. at 360-62.
69. Id. at 362-63.
70. Id. at 365-67 (Stuart, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 365-66.
72. Id. at 367.
73. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); see
also Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 983
(1986); Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing McAlester v.
Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Mer-
ckle v. Harper, 638 F.2d 848, 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
74. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076.
75. See Adams, 764 F.2d at 297-99.
76. Id.
77. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1982).
and conducted a "trial" at a city dump. 8 Other cases involve judges
who make "arrests" and conduct summary "trials. '7 9 Yet another
case involved a judge who, in retaliation against an individual who
had filed a complaint against him, misled a police officer into believ-
ing that the individual should be arrested and disallowed bond.80 For
the most part, though, action taken by a judge in connection with a
judicial proceeding will be considered judicial in nature and thus
within the scope of judicial immunity. This includes acts taken in
connection with child custody proceedings, 8' commitment proceed-
ings,82 probation matters,8 extradition,84 and disciplinary proceed-
ings against attorneys.85
Administrative acts performed by a judge are not regarded as ju-
dicial in nature and, therefore, are not within the scope of judicial
immunity.86 Even when essential to the functioning of a court, ad-
ministrative acts performed by judges are not entitled to the cloak of
immunity, because holding judges liable for such acts does not
threaten judicial independence in the adjudicative process. 87 That an
administrative act is performed by a judge is irrelevant for purposes
of immunity; it is the nature of the act in question, not the office of
the person performing it, that makes it judicial or nonjudicial.88 It
should be noted, though, that the administrative chores of a judge
might be within the ambit of another form of immunity, either quali-
fied or absolute.89
In 1880, the Supreme Court held that judicial immunity did not
apply to a judge charged with racial discrimination in the selection
of jurors for county c6urts.90 In concluding that immunity was not
available, the Court explained that whether an act done by a judge is
judicial or not is determined by its character and not by the charac-
78. Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982).
79. See Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
938 (1980); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978); Wall v. Heath, 622 F. Supp.
105 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
80. King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985).
81. Dear v. Locke, 128 Ill. App. 2d 356, 262 N.E.2d 27 (1970).
82. Devault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193, 194 S.W.2d 29 (1946).
83. Grove v. Rizzolo, 441 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945 (1971).
84. Collins v. Moore, 441 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1971).
85. Peterson v. Knutson, 305 Minn. 53, 233 N.W.2d 716 (1975).
86. Forrester v. White,, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consum-
ers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1880).
87. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228-30.
88. Id.
89. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34.
90. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at
228 ("Although [Ex parte Virginia] involved a criminal charge against a judge, the
reach of the Court's analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that
circumstance.").
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ter of the agent performing it.91 The duty of selecting jurors, the
Court pointed out, might just as well have been performed by a pri-
vate person as by a judge.9 2 Actually, jury selection is often per-
formed by nonjudicial personnel such as county commissioners, su-
pervisors, or assessors, and at one time was performed by sheriffs.
When done by these officials, jury selection can hardly be considered
a judicial function, and the happenstance that it is performed by a
judge does not change its essential nonjudicial character.
9 3
At one time there was a split among the federal circuit courts of
appeals whether, for purposes of determining immunity, actions
taken by judges toward court employees were judicial or administra-
tive in nature. Some circuits had ruled that judges are not immune
from civil liability for demoting or firing employees for improper rea-
sons such as racial or gender discrimination. 4 Focusing upon the na-
ture of the judge's action and the capacity in which a judge deals
with an employee, these courts concluded that demoting or discharg-
ing an employee is an administrative act to which judicial immunity
does not attach.9 5
On the other hand, in Forrester v. White,96 the Seventh Circuit
held that a judge does possess judicial immunity from liability for a
claim that the judge improperly demoted and discharged a probation
officer. The court took the approach that immunity attaches if a
judge's relationship with a court employee affects the judge's capac-
ity to perform judicial functions. In the court's view, a judge's rela-
tionship with a probation officer affects the judge's ability to make
decisions regarding sentencing, probation, and parole, and therefore
should be protected by judicial immunity. 1 Just a few days later,
though, the same court ruled that a judge did not possess immunity
from liability for firing a court reporter because the relationship be-
tween a judge and court reporter does not implicate the judicial
function.98
91. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Guerico v. Brody, 814 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1025 (1988); Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
828 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216 (1985); see also McDonald v. Krajewski, 649 F.
Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
95. See cases cited supra note 94.
96. 792 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
97. Forrester, 792 F.2d at 657.
98. McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985
(1986).
The split among the federal circuits was resolved when the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Forrester.9 The High Court explained that there is no meaningful
distinction between a judge who fires a probation officer and any offi-
cial of the executive branch who is responsible for employment deci-
sions. 100 These employment actions are not part of the judicial func-
tion, regardless of who performs them. And while it is true that some
personnel decisions made by judges may be crucial to the proper op-
eration of the courts, the same is true when it comes to the operation
of the other branches of government.10 Judges, like other govern-
ment officials, may enjoy a qualified immunity in their treatment of
employees, but because employee relations involve administrative
matters rather than judicial ones, judges are not entitled to absolute
judicial immunity for their actions toward court employees.
0 2
According to the general rule, a prior, private agreement by a
judge to rule in favor of one of the parties to a lawsuit is a judicial
act within the scope of judicial immunity. 0 3 It has even been held
that where a judge conspires to rule against an individual and
thereby denies the individual's constitutional rights, such action,
while clearly, improper, is nonetheless judicial in nature and there-
fore immune from civil liability.10 4 Thus, if a judge agrees or con-
spires with a prosecutor, other attorney, or a litigant, to decide a
case a certain way, judicial immunity will not be forfeited. More-
over, bad faith, personal interest, or malevolence on the part of the
judge in entering a prior agreement or conspiracy will not dissipate
judicial immunity. 0 5 Advance agreements or conspiracies by a judge
to rule in favor of a party are within the scope of judicial immunity
so long as the judge is not acting in the clear absence of jurisdic-
tion.10 6 The courts have said that were it otherwise, judges could be
hauled into court and made to defend their judicial acts on mere
allegations of conspiracy or prior agreement. This is the precise
harm that judicial immunity was designed to avoid.1
0 7
Nevertheless, this may be an area where judicial immunity is car-
ried too far. After all, a prior, private agreement by a judge to rule
in a particular way is totally incompatible with the judicial role of
99. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
100. See id. at 229.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 230.
103. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Holloway v.
Walker, 765 F.2d (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985).
104. See Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037
(1985); Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 983
(1986).
105. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1077-78.
106. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
107. See Dykes, 776 F.2d at 946; Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1077.
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deciding cases impartially on the basis of evidence and arguments
presented in court with all parties present. At one time, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that prior agreements to rule a certain way were
not functions normally performed by a judge, and therefore should
not be considered judicial acts within the ambit of judicial immu-
nity.108 However, the Ninth Circuit later reversed itself by focusing
on the judge's act of ruling in a case, which is judicial in nature,
rather than focusing on the prior agreement to rule, which is not.a0 9
This reversal aligned the Ninth Circuit with the other federal cir-
cuits that consistently take the position that prior agreements are
judicial in nature and therefore immunized from liability."10 This po-
sition extends judicial immunity to its breaking point. It is no less
logical to focus on the prior agreement to rule than it is to focus on
the act of ruling, and it is difficult to accept the assertion made by
the courts that the purposes of judicial immunity require a scope so
broad as to include prior agreements and conspiracies."' Certainly,
a cynic would wonder whether anyone but a judge would extend ju-
dicial immunity so far.
C. Injunctive Relief and Attorney's Fees
Under the common law, injunctive relief against judges was un-
known." 2 Injunctive relief was an equitable remedy available only
from the chancellor against parties to cases being heard in other
courts."13 As the Supreme Court has observed, this restriction upon
the use of injunctions indicates nothing about the proper scope of
judicial immunity because the restriction derived from the substan-
tive limits of the chancellor's authority and not from the dictates of
judicial immunity.1 4 Moreover, even under the common law, collat-
eral relief against judges was available in the form of various writs,
such as mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.115
Thus the common law provided for relief, analogous to injunctive
108. See Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
939 (1981).
109. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078.
110. See Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037
(1985); Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 983
(1986); see also Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1985).
111. See Dykes, 776 F.2d at 946-48; Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1077-78.
112. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 875 (11th ed.
1873).
113. Id.
114. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984).
115. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 226-31 (7th ed. 1956).
relief, against judges even when alternative avenues of review ex-
isted.'1 0 This has led the Supreme Court to conclude that in the
common law, there was no inconsistency between the principle of
judicial immunity and the availability of collateral injunctive relief
against judges in exceptional circumstances.
117
There has been general agreement that the doctrine of judicial im-
munity does not bar injunctive relief against judges."18 There are
several reasons for this. The first is that injunctions, being a form of
equitable relief, may only be granted upon a showing that the plain-
tiff is suffering irreparable injury for which there is no adequate le-
gal remedy." 9 This requirement substantially diminishes the charge
that judicial independence will be threatened by disgruntled litigants
seeking injunctive relief against judges.' 20 Second, an injunction di-
recting a judge to do or to refrain from doing something within the
judge's official capacity does not subject the judge to personal liabil-
ity and, hence, does not threaten a judge in the same way as an
action for damages which the judge may have to pay out of personal
funds. Injunctive relief, then, does not pose the same kind of risk to
the judiciary as other forms of liability, and therefore, it is not neces-
sary to use judicial immunity to interdict it.
Judicial immunity is a creation of the common law and, like any
other common law construct, can be superseded by statute. This
principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in Pulliam v. Al-
len,12 1 in which the Court held that Congress may authorize the
awarding of attorney's fees against judges, even when money dam-
ages would be precluded by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Pul-
liam arose from a civil rights action filed against a state magistrate
who repeatedly incarcerated criminal defendants for nonjailable of-
fenses when they were unable to post bond. The federal district court
in which the case was filed found this practice to violate due process
and equal protection of law, and issued an injunction to prohibit it.
The district court also found that the plaintiffs were entitled to attor-
ney's fees in the amount of $7038. The attorney's fees were awarded
by the court under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
116. Gould v. Gapper, 5 East. 345, 102 Eng. Rep. 1102 (R.B. 1804); In re Hill, 10
Ex. Ch. 726 (1855).
117. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 535-36.
118. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 529; R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1233-34
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983); In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1982); WXYZ v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420 (6th Cir.
1981); Heimbach v. Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1979); Harris v. Harvey, 605
F.2d 330, 337 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980).
119. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1979); Judice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 336-38 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975); Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971).
120. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 537-38.
121. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
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1976,122 a federal statute that authorizes courts to award attorney's
fees to plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant-magistrate argued
that the award of attorney's fees should be barred by judicial immu-
nity because attorney's fees are the functional equivalent of mone-
tary damages, the award of which are precluded by immunity. 23
While agreeing that there was some logic to the defendant's argu-
ment, the Court nevertheless upheld the award of attorney's fees on
the ground that it was for Congress, not the Supreme Court, to de-
termine whether and to what degree to abrogate the common law
doctrine of judicial immunity. 2 4 The Court stated that the legisla-
tive history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976
made it perfectly clear that Congress intended that judicial immu-
nity should not be a bar to an award of attorney's fees, even when
damages would be precluded by judicial immunity.12 5
IV. IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
On occasion, judges are sued for making remarks or written state-
ments that are allegedly defamatory. The rule of absolute judicial
immunity shields judges from civil liability for any defamatory re-
marks or statements that they may make. 26 Judicial immunity from
making a defamatory utterance or statement is, of course, an inci-
dent of the civil immunity that judges possess in general. It therefore
serves all of the (previously discussed) purposes of judicial immunity,
the most important of which is to protect the independence of the
judiciary.
127
A few courts have taken the position that a judge is immune from
liability for defamation only for statements that bear relevance to
proceedings before the judge.12 8 This position, however, apparently
confuses the doctrine of judicial immunity with another doctrine by
which statements made by any participant in a judicial proceeding
122. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)).
123. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 543.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 543-44.
126. See O'Bryan v. Chandler, 496 F.2d 403 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
986 (1974); Ginger v. Bowles, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842, cert. denied, 375 U.S.
856 (1963); Reller v. Ankeny, 160 Neb. 47, 68 N.W.2d 686 (1955); Brech v. Seacat, 84
S.D. 264, 170 N.W.2d 348 (1969).
127. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
128. See Wahler v. Schroeder, 9 Ill. App. 3d 505, 292 N.E.2d 521 (1972); Reller,
160 Neb. at 54-55; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 585 comment e (1977).
are privileged. 129 Under the latter doctrine, which functions to foster
openness in the judicial process, defamatory statements made by a
witness, party, or attorney to a lawsuit are privileged (and hence,
cannot form a basis for liability) so long as they are made in the
course of a judicial proceeding and are relevant to it. 130 On the other
hand, judicial immunity, even for defamation, is not conditioned
upon a requirement of relevancy, and the majority of courts have so
held.'' Otherwise, the goals served by judicial immunity, especially
the protection of judicial independence, would be hampered.
As with other instances of judicial immunity, a judge accused of
defamation will not be granted immunity when the judge was acting
in the clear absence of jurisdiction13 2 or when the judge was acting
in a nonjudicial capacity. 133 In accordance with the latter rule, judi-
cial immunity only extends to defamatory statements made in the
course of performance of a judicial function."3 Even if made in the
courtroom, defamatory statements made beyond the scope of the ju-
dicial role are not covered by immunity. 13 On the other hand, state-
ments made by a judge outside the courtroom (as well as those made
in it) are immune if made as part of the judicial function. 36
It is not always a simple matter to determine the perimeters of a
judge's duties and whether a defamatory statement has occurred
within or beyond them. That a lawsuit has been finally concluded
does not necessarily signal the end of the judicial role in it. Thus, in
one case, it was held that immunity still existed in regard to a letter
written by a judge to a prison warden, providing information for fu-
ture parole hearings concerning a criminal defendant already sen-
tenced by the judge. 37
When judges are required by law to convey their opinions to a
court reporter for publication, this is clearly part of the judicial func-
tion, and therefore, any defamatory remarks contained in their pub-
lished opinions are absolutely immune. 38 However, a New York
court held that it was not part of a judge's function to send opinion
129. See M. CoMIsKY & P. PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 243.
130. Id.
131. See Rice v. Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393 (1876); Kraushaar v. Lavin, 39
N.Y.S.2d 880, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Karelas v. Baldwin, 237 A.D. 265, 261 N.Y.S. 518
(1932); Houghton v. Humphries, 85 Wash. 50, 147 P. 641 (1915).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 65-111.
134. See Garfield v. Palmieri, 297 F.2d 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871
(1962); Ginger v. Bowles, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842 (1963) cert. denied, 375 U.S.
856 (1963); Murray v. Brancato, 290 N.Y. 52, 48 N.E.2d 257 (1943).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 65-111.
136. See Kraushaar v. Lavin, 39 N.Y.S.2d 880, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
137. Brech v. Seacat, 84 S.D. 264, 170 N.W.2d 348 (1969).
138. See Garfield, 297 F.2d at 527-28; see also McGovern v. Marty, 182 F. Supp.
343 (D.D.C. 1960).
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to an unofficial reporter, and therefore, defamatory statements in the
opinion were not cloaked with immunity. 3 9 Distinguishing between
official and unofficial reporters seems highly questionable, and in a
subsequent New York case, a circuit court reached a contrary re-
sult.140 Even in New York, it is clear that when a judge is directed
by law to submit an opinion to.a reporter, statements in the opinion
are covered by judicial immunity. If a judge did not play a part in
sending the opinion to the reporter, the judge cannot be held liable
for any defamatory remarks it may contain.
1 41
V. MISAPPROPRIATION OR MISUSE OF FUNDS AND ESTATES
There are cases in which judges have been found civilly liable for
misappropriating funds entrusted to their care.14 However, in these
cases the doctrine of judicial immunity apparently was overlooked,
because there is no mention of it. Nevertheless, misappropriation of
funds entrusted to the care of a judge may be beyond the scope of
immunity on the ground that it is not a judicial act. Or, liability for
misappropriating funds may be imposed on judges by statutory pro-
visions that overrule, in some aspects, the common law doctrine of
immunity. 43 Whatever the rationale might be, it seems quite reason-
able to hold judges liable for misappropriating funds for their own
use. Such behavior, after all, amounts to theft, and judges should be
made to return any funds they have stolen from others.
On the other hand, immunity should shield judges from liability
for honest errors of judgment they may commit in administering
funds or estates assigned to their care. According to the case law,
judges do possess immunity for honest mistakes in the administration
of funds or estates.144 There are a few decisions, though, which state
that immunity does not cover ministerial acts by judges that result in
negligent loss to an estate.' 45 Ministerial acts are usually regarded as
nonjudicial in character and, hence, not within the ambit of immu-
nity.146 In some instances, judges are made liable by statute for the
139. See Murray v. Brancato, 290 N.Y. 52, 48 N.E.2d 257 (1943).
140. Garfield v. Palmieri, 297 F.2d 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871
(1962).
141. See Bradford v. Pette, 204 Misc. 308 (N.Y. 1953).
142. See Brown v. Rutledge, 20 Ga. App. 118, 92 S.E. 774 (1916); King County v.
United Pac. Ins. Co., 72 Wash. 2d 604, 434 P.2d 554 (1967).
143. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 120 Ky. 433, 86 S.W. 990 (1905).
144. See Truesdale v. Bellinger, 172 S.C. 80, 172 S.E. 784 (1934).
145. See e.g., id. at 87-88, 172 S.W. at 787.
146. American Surety Co. v. Skaggs' Guardian, 247 Ky. 687, 57 S.W.2d 495
negligent administration of an estate resulting in loss to the estate.
147
VI. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. General Rule of No Immunity
But for one narrow exception, 45 judicial immunity does not ex-
empt judges from criminal liability.'49 Courts have stated unequivo-
cally that the judicial title does not render its holder immune from
responsibility even when the criminal act is committed behind the
shield of judicial office. 150 As is the case regarding immunity from
civil liability,' immunity from criminal liability does not extend to
nonjudicial acts or acts taken in the clear absence of all jurisdic-
tion. 5 2 Even beyond such acts, however, judicial immunity generally
is not available for criminal behavior. For instance, judicial immu-
nity does not shield judges from criminal liability for fraud or cor-
ruption, or for soliciting or accepting bribes.'5 3 This is as it should
be; although important, the purposes of the doctrine of judicial im-
munity are not so important that they transcend the function of the
criminal law to protect the public from crime, especially crime as
egregious as fraud, corruption, or bribery. As a consequence, judicial
immunity normally stops short of protecting criminal behavior.
The one area where judges can be said to enjoy immunity from
criminal liability is for malfeasance or misfeasance in the perform-
ance of judicial tasks undertaken in good faith.' In some states
malfeasance or misfeasance in office is made criminal either by stat-
ute or common law rule. 15 5 However, this criminal liability will be
precluded by judicial immunity unless the malfeasance or misfea-
sance is accompanied by bad faith. 56
Furthermore, even in this area, judicial immunity will not be
granted for malfeasance or misfeasance by a judicial officer in the
performance of an act that is administrative in character rather than
(1983); Heyn v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1937).
147. See cases cited supra note 146.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
149. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880); Braatelien v. United
States, 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945); McFarland v. State, 172 Neb. 251, 109 N.W.2d
397 (1961).
150. Braatelien, 147 F.2d at 895; McFarland, 172 Neb. at 260, 109 N.W.2d at
404.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 55-111.
152. See Braatelien, 147 F.2d at 895; McFarland, 172 Neb. at 260, 109 N.W.2d
at 404.
153. See Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945); McFarland v.
State, 172 Neb. 251, 109 N.W.2d 397 (1961).
154. See Hamilton v. Williams, 26 Ala. 527 (1855); Commonwealth v. Tartar, 239
S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1951); In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
155. See M. COMISKY & P. PATrERSON, supra note 19, at 239.
156. See cases cited supra note 149.
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judicial. In Ex parte Virginia,157 the Supreme Court ruled that judi-
cial immunity would not be given to a judge indicted for excluding
qualified black persons from jury lists because the selection of jurors
was an administrative task, not a judicial one.'58 As previously
noted, the nonjudicial nature of jury selection is indicated in that it
is a task often performed by nonjudicial personnel and, indeed, is one
that could be performed by private persons.'59 Given the ministerial
character of jury selection, the court ruled, the judge was not pro-
tected by judicial immunity from criminal liability. 60
The Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Virginia apparently
was overlooked in Commonwealth v. Tartar,'6' in which the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals ruled that a judge was entitled to immunity
from criminal misfeasance for improperly certifying a list of grand
jurors whose names had not been drawn from a jury wheel or drum
as required by law. Although the judge's action in this case would
seem to be no less a ministerial task than the judge's action in Ex
parte Virginia, the Tartar court made no mention of the thought
that certification of jurors might be a nonjudicial task not covered by
immunity. While the situation in Tartar, unlike that in Ex parte
Virginia, did not involve the pernicious behavior of racial discrimina-
tion, the supposedly controlling factor in granting immunity is
whether the act in question is judicial or administrative; in that re-
spect, the cases appear to be indistinguishable.
Except for cases involving malfeasance or misfeasance in office,
claims of judicial immunity for criminal behavior are unavailing.
Hence, in Braatelien v. United States,1 2 it was held that a judge
could not claim immunity from a criminal charge of conspiring to
defraud the government. The court pointed out that the judge in
question had not been indicted for an erroneous or even wrongful
judicial act, but for criminal behavior that was distinct from his offi-
cial functions.163 The court noted that the crime could have been
completed without the performance of a single judicial act by the
judge and, therefore, amounted to nonjudicial behavior beyond the
bounds of immunity. 64 Moreover, the court stated that judges may
157. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
158. See id. at 348.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
160. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348.
161. 239 S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1951).
162. 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945).
163. Id. at 895.
164. Id.
be held criminally responsible for fraud or corruption because judi-
cial immunity provides no cloak for criminal behavior.,,
Immunity from criminal liability was also found not to exist in
McFarland v. State, 66 in which a judge not only collaborated with a
criminal defendant to wrongfully secure the defendant's release by
issuing a void writ of habeas corpus, but also improperly cited an-
other judge for disregarding the void writ. For engaging in these ac-
tions, the judge was charged with the crime of constructive con-
tempt, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska it was ruled
that the judge could not claim immunity for this sort of behavior
because it was nonjudicial in nature. Indeed, the Nebraska high
court made the statement that "[t]o say that such conduct was
outside the realm of judicial action is to put it mildly."''6 7 This state-
ment, though, is questionable. Although the court undoubtedly was
correct in saying that the judge acted fraudulently and corruptly,
and that he unlawfully attempted to interfere with a criminal pro-
ceeding, the fact remains that the judge did so, at least in part, by
issuing a writ and a contempt citation-both of which are actions
that judges normally perform, and that would usually be considered
judicial functions. However, the court was on more solid ground in
noting that the judge acted in the absence of jurisdiction, and that
judicial immunity does not extend to this sort of criminal
behavior." 8
Judges need not be impeached before being indicted and tried on
criminal charges.'69 Even federal judges, who "hold their Offices
during good Behavior"' 170 under article III of the Constitution, may
be criminally prosecuted while still in office. The Constitution does
not bar the trial of a judge for alleged crimes committed before or
after taking office. The tenure granted to federal judges by article
III is not meant to give shelter to criminal behavior, and therefore,
impeachment of a judge is not a prerequisite to criminal
prosecution.'17
B. Criminal Activity as Grounds for Removal from Judicial
Office or Other Disciplinary Sanctions
In some states it is provided by constitutional enactment, statute,
or supreme court rule that conviction of a judge of certain crimes
165. Id.
166. 172 Neb. 251, 109 N.W.2d 397 (1961).
167. Id. at 260, 109 N.W.2d at 403.
168. Id.
169. See United States v. Issacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
170. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
171. Issacs, 493 F.2d at 1140-44.
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operates to automatically remove the judge from office. The content
of these provisions differ slightly: most mandate removal from office
upon conviction of a felony, 172 others upon conviction of a crime in-
volving moral turpitude,7M and yet others upon conviction of an "in-
famous" crime.1 4 Essentially, they all provide for removal from of-
fice of judges who have been convicted of committing a serious
crime. Under these provisions, judges have been removed from office
for engaging in mail fraud,175 racketeering,' 76 bribery,177 extor-
tion, 7 8 obstructing justice, 17 9 assault, 80 and other felonies or serious
crimes.' 8' These provisions ordinarily do not allow judges to chal-
lenge their convictions as being erroneous; once a conviction becomes
final, that in itself will operate to require a forfeiture of the judicial
office'8 2 and may also disqualify the convicted judge from holding
office in the future.'
83
Some provisions further direct that if a judge is indicted on a seri-
ous criminal charge, the judge will be suspended from office, pending
final adjudication of the charge.184 It has been held that such suspen-
sions, even though they occur prior to a determination of guilt, do
not violate the due process clause because of the overriding public
interest in ensuring an upstanding judiciary.8 5 During the period of
suspension, a judge may continue to be entitled to receive his or her
salary.'8 6 But once a criminal conviction becomes final, permanent
forfeiture of office will occur and the payment of salary will be
172. E.g., Ky. Sup. CT. R. 4.020; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(2); OR. CONST. art.
VII, § 8(1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.120 (1988).
173. E.g., WYo. CONST. art. V, § 6(c).
174. E.g., PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
175. In re Callanan, 419 Mich. 376, 355 N.W.2d 69 (1984).
176. Sullivan v. State ex reL Attorney Gen., 472 So. 2d 970 (Ala. 1985).
177. In re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 472 A.2d 546 (1984).
178. In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 309 S.E.2d 442 (1983).
179. In re Tindall, 60 Cal. 2d 469, 386 P.2d 473, 34 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 966 (1964).
180. State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wash. 2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 (1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
181. For a summary of modem cases involving the criminal conduct of judges, see
AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'Y, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY DIGEST 355-58
(1981).
182. See State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wash. 2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 (1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); In re Callanan, 419 Mich. 376, 355 N.W.2d 69
(1984).
183. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.120 (1988).
184. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 18.
185. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
186. E.g., MICH. CT. R. 9.220.
terminated. 18 7
Criminal behavior on the part of a judge also may run afoul of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Criminal conduct is an affront to canon 1
of the Code, which requires judges to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary and to observe high standards of behavior. 188 Criminal con-
duct further offends canon 2, which requires judges to avoid impro-
priety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. 18 9
Indeed, criminal activity obviously contravenes both of these canons
by undermining public confidence in the judiciary and impairing the
administration of justice. 90
A wide variety of crimes have been held to violate the Code of
Judicial Conduct when committed by a judge. They include tax eva-
sion, 191 receiving stolen goods, 92 contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, 193 driving under the influence of alcohol,9  use of illegal
drugs, 95 jury tampering, 98 racketeering, 0 7 battery,'9 8 resisting po-
lice officers,' 99 and welfare fraud.200 These are but some of the crimi-
nal actions that have been found to violate the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Some courts have held that even in the absence of a criminal con-
viction, a judge may violate the Code of Judicial Conduct if it
merely appears that the judge has committed a crime. This occurred
in In re Killam,2 °' in which a judge was charged with driving under
the influence of alcohol. At his criminal trial, the judge admitted
facts sufficient to establish a finding of guilt on the charge, but the
trial court continued the case for one year on the condition that the
judge enter and successfully complete a driver alcohol education pro-
gram. The judge did so, and the criminal charges against him even-
187. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.120 (1988).
188. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT Canon 1 (1972).
189. 'Id. Canon 2.
190. See In re Wireman, 270 Ind. 344, 367 N.E.2d 1368 (1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 904 (1978); In re Callanan, 419 Mich. 376, 355 N.W.2d 69 (1984); In re Duncan,
541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1976); In re Hunt, 308 N.C. 328, 302 S.E.2d 235 (1983); W. Va.
Judicial Inquiry Comm'n v. Dostert, 165 W. Va. 233, 271 S.E.2d 427 (1980).
191. In re Van Susteren, 118 Wis. 2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984).
192. In re Maxwell, 287 S.C. 594, 340 S.E.2d 541 (1986).
193. Id.
194. In re Killam, 388 Mass. 619, 447 N.E.2d 1233 (1983).
195. Starnes v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 680 S.W.2d 922 (Ky.
1984); In re Whitaker, 463 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1985).
196. In re Robert Dean Hawkins, (Unreported Order, Judicial Retirement & Re-
moval Comm'n, Ky. Nov. 28, 1984).
197. In re Callanan, 419 Mich. 376, 355 N.W.2d 69 (1984); In re Raineri, 102
Wis. 2d 418, 306 N.W.2d 699 (1981).
198. In re Roth, 293 Or. 179, 645 P.2d 1064 (1982).
199. Roberts v. Comm'n on Jud. Performance, 33 Cal. 3d 739, 661 P.2d 1064, 190
Cal. Rptr. 910 (1983).
200. In re Inquiry Concerning A Judge No. 491, 249 Ga. 30, 287 S.E.2d 2 (1982).
201. 388 Mass. 619, 447 N.E.2d 1233 (1983).
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tually were dismissed. Nonetheless, in a separate disciplinary pro-
ceeding, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the
judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by driving under
the influence of alcohol. The dismissal of the criminal charges, in the
court's opinion, had no effect upon the disciplinary proceedings be-
cause the criminal law serves different purposes than the disciplinary
process.202 Regardless of what the criminal court ruled, the state su-
preme court, when later considering the disciplinary action, thought
the evidence disclosed in the criminal proceeding showed that the
judge did actually drive while under the influence of alcohol and
thus violated the Code by bringing undeserved discredit to the
judiciary.20
A plea of nolo contendere to a criminal charge, in itself, may con-
stitute a violation of the Code. In In re Inquiry Concerning A Judge
No. 491,204 the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the Judicial Qual-
ification Commission's finding that a judge's plea of nolo contendere
to a crime involving moral turpitude had brought the judicial office
into disrepute, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, even
though the question of guilt was not formally adjudicated by such a
plea.20 5 Notwithstanding that there existed a statute prohibiting the
use of the plea as an admission of guilt, the Georgia Supreme Court
held that because the Commission was not inquiring into the guilt of
the judge as charged, but merely whether the judge's plea of no con-
test had brought the judicial office into disrepute, the Commission
could not be restricted by legislative act from considering "any con-
duct of a judicial officer which reflects on the question they are
called upon to decide. 20 6
C. The Relationship Between the Criminal Process and the
Disciplinary Process: The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy
As a general rule, the doctrine of double jeopardy does not operate
as a bar to judicial disciplinary proceedings regarding conduct that
has previously been the subject of adjudication in a criminal trial.2 °
202. Id. at 622, 447 N.E.2d at 1235-36.
203. Id. at 623, 447 N.E.2d at 1236.
204. 249 Ga. 30, 287 S.E.2d 2 (1982).
205. Id. at 31, 287 S.E.2d at 4.
206. Id.
207. See In re Burns (Unreported Judgment COJ-7, Ala. Ct. Jud., July 18, 1977);
In re Biggins, 153 Ariz. 439, 737 P.2d 1077 (1987); McComb v. Comm'n on Jud. Per-
formance, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1977); In re Inquiry Concerning
A Judge No. 491, 249 Ga. 30, 287 S.E.2d 2 (1982); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Fun-
Double jeopardy ordinarily applies only when one criminal action is
followed by another, and because judicial disciplinary proceedings
are considered noncriminal in nature, double jeopardy does not at-
tach between them and a prior criminal adjudication. 0 3 While shar-
ing some similarities with the criminal process, judicial disciplinary
proceedings are usually considered a distinct entity, sui generis, and
therefore double jeopardy does not arise between the criminal and
disciplinary processes.20 9
For purposes of the doctrine of double jeopardy, many courts con-
sider judicial disciplinary proceedings to be noncriminal in nature
because they function differently than the criminal law. 10 While
some courts have arrived at this conclusion because judicial proceed-
ings do not result in the imposition of imprisonment or fines,211 other
courts have determined that such proceedings are noncriminal be-
cause their purpose is not to punish, but to maintain the honor and
integrity of the judiciary and to restore and reaffirm the public confi-
dence in the administration of justice.2 12 In short, it has been said
that the essence of the sanction imposed in disciplinary cases is not
"punishment." Instead, sanctions are based on grounds bearing a ra-
tional relationship to the interests of the state in the fitness of its
judicial personnel. 213 The judicial disciplinary process further differs
from the criminal process in that it does not entail severe penalties,
such as imprisonment, which require special procedural protection
before they may be imposed. As a result, in those instances for
which the particular conduct transgresses both the criminal law and
the canons of ethics, prosecution may be pursued under either or
both systems without invoking constitutional double jeopardy
concerns. 2
14
Judicial disciplinary proceedings have also been described by some
courts as regulatory in nature.215 In states that have adopted the
derburk, 284 So. 2d 564 (La. 1973); In re Szymanski, 400 Mich. 469, 255 N.W.2d 601
(1977); In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1977).
208. See cases cited supra note 207.
209. See In re Haddad, 128 Ariz. 490, 492, 627 P.2d 221, 223 (1981).
210. See id.; In re Kelley, 238 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
962 (1971); In re Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158 (Me. 1985); In re Storie, 574 S.E.2d 369 (Mo.
1978); In re Wright, 313 N.C. 495, 329 S.E.2d 668 (1985).
211. See Kelley, 238 So. 2d at 569.
212. See Benoit, 487 A.2d at 1174;'In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Sharpe v. State, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969); In re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 472 A.2d 546, appeal
dismissed, 469 U.S. 802 (1984); Wright, 313 N.C. at 499, 329 S.E.2d at 671.
213. Kelley, 238 So. 2d at 569.
214. See People v. La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 661, 416 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206, 389
N.E.2d 799, 802 (1979); see also cases cited supra note 207.
215. E.g., In re Haddad, 128 Ariz. 490, 492, 627 P.2d 221, 223 (1981); Coruzzi,
95 N.J. at 570, 472 A.2d at 557.
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two-tier model of judicial conduct organizations, 16 proceedings in
the first tier, where no adjudication occurs, have been said to be
merely investigatory or quasi-administrative. As such, they serve a
function similar to that of a grand jury to which double jeopardy
does not attach.217 (This, however, does not explain why double jeop-
ardy concerns would not come into play at the second tier of the
proceedings.)
In accordance with these general principles, the Alabama Court of
the Judiciary in In re Burns,21a ruled that it was not precluded from
censuring a judge for proposing an act of prostitution to a woman, in
violation of' canon 2, even though this conduct had already been the
basis of the judge's criminal conviction of disorderly conduct. Prior
adjudication of the conduct in a criminal proceeding did not bar fur-
ther inquiry of the same conduct in a disciplinary proceeding by the
Court of the Judiciary.
The unavailability of the defense of double jeopardy to a judicial
disciplinary commission proceeding is further illustrated by In re
Bates.219 In Bates, the Judicial Qualification Commission of Texas
was allowed to proceed with its hearing prior to the completion of
criminal prosecution on the same subject matter because the Com-
mission's hearing was deemed a "separate and distinct matter and
completely independent of any other proceedings which were pend-
ing."' 220 A similar result was reached by the California Supreme
Court in McComb v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications.2'
There, the court likened a judicial proceeding to that of a state bar
disciplinary proceeding for which criminal procedural safeguards do
not apply due to the noncriminal nature of the proceeding.222
Employing similar reasoning, courts have also held that legislative
action to remove or impeach a judge on grounds of- misconduct in
office does not invoke double jeopardy protection against subsequent
216. See I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2d ed.
1980).
217. See In re Sanford, 352 So. 2d 1126, 1128-29 (Ala. 1977); In re Ross, 428
A.2d 858, 860 (Me. 1981); In re Judge Anonymous, 590 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Okla. 1978).
218. In re Burns (Unreported Judgment COJ-7, Ala. Ct. Jud., July 18, 1977); In
re Biggins, 153 Ariz. 439, 737 P.2d 1077 (1987); McComb v. Comm'n on Jud. Perform-
ance, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1977); In re Inquiry Concerning A
Judge No. 491, 249 Ga. 30, 287 S.E.2d 2 (1982); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Funder-
burk, 284 So. 2d 564 (La. 1973); In re Szymanski, 400 Mich. 469, 255 N.W.2d 601
(1977); In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1977).
219. 555 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1977).
220. Id. at 428.
221. 19 Cal. 3d Spec. Trib. Supp. 1, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1977).
222. Id. at 9, 564 P.2d at 5, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
disciplinary proceedings based on the same misconduct. In Ransford
v. Graham,223 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the refusal
of the state House of Representatives to vote for the removal of a
judge did not bar, on double jeopardy grounds, subsequent proceed-
ings by the state supreme court regarding the judge's fitness to serve.
The court held that neither the impeachment nor the disciplinary
actions were criminal in nature, and therefore, the doctrine of double
jeopardy did not apply.224 Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has taken the position, in In re Mattera,225 that impeachment only
determines a judge's right to hold office and is not intended to bar or
delay other actions for a public wrong. The court held that a single
act of misconduct may offend the public interest in a number of ar-
eas, and justice requires an appropriate remedy for each harm
created.226
The New Jersey Supreme Court could find no reason why a pre-
scription in the Constitution of a remedy for one purpose should be
found to imply an intention to deny government the power to protect
the public in its other interests or to immunize the offender from
further consequences of his or her acts.227 This view was reiterated
by the Texas Supreme Court in In re Carrillo,228 where it was held
that a judge's removal from office by a state senate impeachment
proceeding did not preclude judicial action based on the same con-
duct leading to the removal. The court ruled that both proceedings
could be pursued concurrently.229
As a result of courts' refusal to apply the doctrine of double jeop-
ardy to judicial disciplinary proceedings, a judge's prior criminal
conviction may be admitted as evidence of judicial misconduct in a
subsequent disciplinary inquiry. 3° In Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v.
Funderburk,231 a judge's guilty plea to criminal charges was entered
as competent evidence of misconduct at a subsequent commission in-
vestigation, and it created a rebuttable presumption of guilt which
the respondent judge had the burden to overcome. Similarly, in In re
Biggins,2 the Arizona Supreme Court held that a judge's conviction
of driving under the influence of alcohol afforded an "entirely inde-
223. 374 Mich. 104, 131 N.W.2d 201 (1964).
224. Id. at 105, 131 N.W.2d at 203.
225. 34 N.J. 259, 168 A.2d 38 (1961).
226. Id. at 266, 168 A.2d at 42.
227. Id.
228. 542 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1976).
229. Id. at 108; see also In re Mussman, 112 N.H. 99, 289 A.2d 403 (1972).
230. See In re Biggins, 153 Ariz. 439, 737 P.2d 1077 (1987); In re Inquiry Con-
cerning A Judge No. 491, 249 Ga. 30, 287 S.E.2d 2 (1982); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v.
Funderburk, 284 So. 2d 564 (La. 1973); In re Callanan, 419 Mich. 376, 355 N.W.2d 69
(1984).
231. 284 So. 2d 564 (La. 1973).
232. 153 Ariz. 439, 737 P.2d 1077 (1987).
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pendent and self-sufficient basis for sustaining the commission's cen-
sure recommendation. 213 3 In the opinion of the Arizona court, the
judge's conviction was of sufficient consequence to be, in and of it-
self, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, bringing the
judicial office into disrepute." 4 This view was also expressed in In re
Callanan,3 5 in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that a
judge's felony conviction for violations of the RICO act was suffi-
cient evidence of conduct which brought the judicial office into
disrepute. 36
The general refusal by the courts to apply double jeopardy protec-
tion to judicial disciplinary proceedings has not gone entirely without
criticism. In In re Friess,237 a New York trial court said that the
contention of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that its pro-
ceedings were merely disciplinary and, therefore, not subject to crim-
inal trial standards, was "either niave [sic] or hyprocritical [sic] "238
Whatever label might be assigned to the proceedings, the court said,
was merely an exercise in semantics. The court, instead, held that
common law safeguards attach "to any significant hearing where the
State attempts to deprive an individual of property without due pro-
cess." 239 Viewing the current livelihood and good reputation of its
judges as valuable property rights, the New York court held that a
judge is entitled to all the constitutional rights of a fair trial, includ-
ing, but not limited to, protection from double jeopardy or star
chamber proceedings.24
Despite the concerns of the trial court in Friess, its grant of the
petitioner's request for a severance of charges in accordance with
constitutional safeguards was modified by the New York appellate
division in In re Application of Friess,241 to the extent of denying the
request for severance and removing constitutional double jeopardy
protection from disciplinary proceedings. In doing so, the appellate
court distinguished disciplinary proceedings from criminal ones by
their differing purposes and nature, as well as the disparity of penal-
ties involved, noting particularly that in disciplinary proceedings the
233. Id. at 443-44, 737 P.2d at 1081-82.
234. Id.
235. 419 Mich. 376, 355 N.W.2d 69 (1984).
236. Id. at 387-89, 355 N.W. 2d at 74.
237. N.Y.L.J., June 2, 1982 at 1, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 27), modified, 91
A.D.2d 554, 457 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1982).
238. Friess, N.Y.L.J., June 2, 1982 at 7, col. 2.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 91 A.D.2d 554, 457 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1982).
fundamental right of liberty is not at stake.242 The appellate court in
Friess also pointed out that the hearer of fact in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding is routinely a seasoned former jurist as opposed to a panel of
lay jurors. In the opinion of the court, these former jurists are fully
capable of distinguishing between proof submitted on one charge and
proof submitted on another or previous charge.243
CONCLUSION
Under the law, judicial liability for criminal activity is treated
quite differently than judicial liability for tortious or other noncrimi-
nal wrongful conduct. With one minor exception for malfeasance or
misfeasance in office, judges possess no immunity for their criminal
behavior. Whatever threat criminal liability might pose to judicial
independence, it is not strong enough to override the importance of
enforcing the criminal law, even against judges. No one ought to be
exempt from the criminal law, and it has been consistently recog-
nized that judges should not be able to hide behind their office as
shelter for criminal behavior that harms society.
On the other hand, judges enjoy a substantial degree of immunity
from civil liability. Indeed, judges possess not only a qualified immu-
nity from civil liability, like their fellow public servants in the execu-
tive branch, but also an absolute immunity that protects them even
when they commit wrongs intentionally or maliciously. It is true that
judicial immunity stops short of shielding nonjudicial actions or ac-
tions taken in the clear absence 6f all jurisdiction, but these limits on
the doctrine of judicial immunity are applied sparingly, if not reluc-
tantly. Within these limits, the intentional and malicious civil wrongs
of judges, no matter how egregious, are cloaked with absolute
immunity.
It is said that this grant of absolute immunity for judges is neces-
sary to maintain judicial independence and to protect judges from
harassment by disgruntled litigants. Surely these are admirable
goals, but whether absolute immunity, as distinct from qualified im-
munity, is truly necessary to effectuate them is an open question. A
grant of immunity for intentional and malicious civil wrongs has not
been found necessary in the executive branch of government. Judi-
cial independence should be scrupulously guarded and some degree
of immunity from civil liability must be maintained for judges. But
absolute judicial immunity from civil liability remains a debatable
practice.
242. Id. at 556, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
243. Id.
